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DON'T KILL INNOVATION: WHY THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S
"ONE COPY-ONE USER" DOCTRINE SHOULD PROTECT
INTERNET STREAMING OF BROADCAST TELEVISION
Colin P. Pool*
The world of 7:30 on Tuesday nights, that's dead. A stake has been
driven through its heart, its head has been cut off, and its mouth has been
stuffed with garlic. The captive audience is gone.
-David Fincher, Executive Producer, House of Cards.
I. INTRODUCTION
The way people watch television is changing. The modem viewer
wants "to be able to decide [what they] want to watch .. . and have it
just appear," and technology is quickly making that desire a reality.2
Yet, much as they have done in the past, content owners are attempting
to litigate3 (or legislate4) new innovations out of existence rather than
adapt to the changing digital marketplace, and the consumer is
suffering.5 An example of this phenomenon is at the heart of several
recent conflicting federal court decisions.
On March 14, 2012, Aereo, "a new Internet based television solution
for consumers," launched exclusively in the New York metropolitan
area.6 The service gives consumers access to the programming of
twenty-eight over-the-air broadcast television channels on their Internet-
enabled devices (such as iPhones and iPads), allowing them to watch
* Associate Member, 2012-2013 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank Timothy K. Armstrong for his assistance.
1. Robert Abele, Playing with a New Deck, DGA QUARTERLY (Winter 2013), available at
http://www.dga.org/CrafVDGAQ/All-Articles/1301-Winter-2013/House-of-Cards.aspx.
2. Mat Honan, Why You Shouldn't Buy a TV This Year. Again, WIRED.COM (Dec. 27, 2012,
2:42 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/12/watch-and-wait-ts-column.
3. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
4. See, e.g., The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
5. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 75-76,
188-99 (2004); Republican Study Committee, RSC Policy Brief Three Myths About Copyright Law and
Where to Start to Fix It (Nov. 16, 2012) (this publication was officially withdrawn but is available at
http://torrentfreak.com/strict-copyright-law-hurts-innovation-and-consumers-republicans-say- 121118).
6. Aereo Announces $20.5M Series A Financing Led by JAC; New Technology Platform Allows
Consumers Access to Live TV Over the Internet, MARKETWIRE (Feb. 14, 2012),
http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/aereo-announces-205m-series-a-financing-led-iac-new-
technology-platform-allows-consumers-nasdaq-iaci-1 619629.htm [hereinafter Aereo Announces $20.5M
Series A Financing].
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live television "on the go."7  Reviews were positive, describing the
service's "thoughtful, clean user interface" and its "startlingly good"
video quality.8  The service attracted numerous hi h-profile investors
and looked to become a "transformative technology.'
Yet Aereo did all of this without asking for permission from the
television networks, prompting a copyright infringement lawsuit before
the service even launched. 0 The networks alleged that the service was
an unauthorized retransmission of their copyrighted content, and thus
was unlawful under section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976.11 They
asked the court for an injunction against the continued operation of the
service, but the Southern District of New York denied this request.12
The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's reasoning and denied the
plaintiffs' interlocutory appeal of the decision.13  The Second Circuit
then denied an en banc rehearingl4 and petitioned the Supreme Court for
15certiorari. 
Soon after the Southern District of New York's ruling,
"Aereokiller,"l 6 a rival company, launched a service functionally
identical to Aereo's in four media markets.' 7  Five days later, the Fox
network filed suit in the Central District of California, alleging
copyright infringement and requesting injunctive relief.18  Aereokiller
relied heavily on the Southern District of New York's Aereo decision as
a defense, but the Central District of California was not persuaded.
Stating that Second Circuit precedent does not apply in the Ninth
7. Katherine Boehret, Aereo Shines with Limited Live TVon the Go, WSJ.COM (July 18, 2012,
2:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303612804577533070691481182.html.
8. Id
9. Aereo Announces $20.5MSeries A Financing, supra note 6.
10. Complaint, Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No.
12CV01540), 2012 WL 676194. The complaint was filed on March 1, 2012, almost two weeks before
the service's official launch date. The following networks were plaintiffs: ABC, CBS, NBC,
Telemundo, and WNET. Id.
11. Id. at IN 25, 31-33. For a detailed explanation of the relevant copyright statutes, see infra
Part II(B).
12. Am. Broad. Co., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
13. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 696 (2d Cir. 2013).
14. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2013).
15. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461 (2013).
16. Aereokiller's original name was BarryDriller.com, which was intended as a joke directed at
one of Aereo's primary investors, Barry Diller, chairman of IAC/InterActiveCorp. Mr. Diller sued
BarryDriller.com over the use of the name and won a preliminary injunction, prompting the renaming of
the service. See Diller v. Barry Driller, Inc., No. CV 12-7200 ABC (Ex), 2012 WL 4044732, at *1, 10
(C.D. Cal., Sept. 10, 2012). Aereokiller's service is now known as FilmOn X. See Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X, L.L.C., No. 13-758 (RMC), 2013 WL 4763414 (D.D.C., Sept. 5, 2013).
17. Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages I 1, 3-4, Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (No. CV 12-
6921-GW(JCx)), 2012 WL 7151080.
18. Id. at$ 12.
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Circuit, the court found for the plaintiffs and ordered the entry of a
preliminary injunction against Aereokiller within the Ninth Circuit.19
Recently, two additional federal courts have weighed in. The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled against
Aereokiller (in an opinion which largely follows the same reasoning as
the Central District of California's), but the District of Massachusetts
ruled in favor of Aereo (in an opinion which basically agrees with the
Second Circuit).21
This flurry of litigation has resulted in an interesting situation: one
technology with several competing decisions regarding its legality. The
conflict between the courts centers on what constitutes a "public
performance" under copyright law and under what circumstances, if
any, a "private performance" can be transmitted to a viewer. The split
outcome leaves the technology in geographic limbo-available in some
locations but not others-and leaves many consumers without access to
a useful service.
This Note will examine the controversy. Part II offers explanations of
the technology, the applicable copyright law, and prior decisions
interpreting the "public performance" right of copyright owners. Part III
examines two of the competing decisions in depth. Parts IV and V will
discuss the jurisprudential and policy questions the cases raise and will
conclude that the Second Circuit's interpretation serves the best interests
of both consumers and innovation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Technology
An understanding of various television transmission and recording
technologies is critical to an understanding of the legal issue discussed
in this Note. Standard over-the-air television stations broadcast their
signals over publicly owned electromagnetic frequencies, and their
programming is freely available to anyone with an antenna and a
19. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D.
Cal. 2012). See also id. at 1141 ("Courts should not issue nationwide injunctions where the injunction
would not issue under the law of another circuit. 'Principles of comity require that, once a sister circuit
has spoken to an issue, that pronouncement is the law of that geographical area. Courts in the Ninth
Circuit should not grant relief that would cause substantial interference with the established judicial
pronouncements of such sister circuits. To hold otherwise would create tension between circuits and
would encourage forum shopping."') (quoting U.S. v. AMC Entm't, 549 F.3d 760, 773 (9th Cir. 2008)).
20. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X, L.L.C., No. 13-758 (RMC), 2013 WL 4763414
(D.D.C., Sept. 5, 2013).
21. Hearst Stations, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-11649 (NMG), 2013 WL 5604284 (D. Mass.,
Oct. 8, 2013).
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television.22 However, the vast majority of viewers actually receive
broadcast television programming through cable or satellite television
providers,23 who are required by law to pay license fees for the right to
retransmit this programming to consumers.
Since the advent of the videocassette recorder (VCR), consumers
have been able to record television shows for later "time-shifted"
viewing.25 The VCR's modern iteration, the digital video recorder
(DVR), allows consumers to record programs to hard disk instead of
videotapes.26 A more recent innovation, the "remote storage digital
video recorder" (RS-DVR), moves the data storage to a cable television
provider's servers. For the consumer, the end result is the same: users
can select whether to record a show already in progress (and thus
rewind, pause, etc.) or to schedule the recording of a program to be
viewed later. But instead of the program being stored on and
transmitted from the viewer's set-top box, the program is stored on and
transmitted from the cable provider's servers.27 Another new
technology, the "Slingbox," allows a user to transmit the output of a
video source such as a DVR over the Internet so that the consumer can
watch television on an Internet-enabled device away from the television,
a process called "place-shifting." 28
The Aereo/Aereokiller technology builds on the usefulness of the
Slingbox by removing the need for the hardware. Aereo's website
allows its customers to select whether to "watch" or "record" available
television shows from a programming guide that lists both currently-
22. Greg Sandoval, TV Networks Say Aereo Is "Indeed a Retransmitter"-and Must Pay,
CNET.COM (May 30, 2012, 11:53 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57443751-93/tv-networks-
say-aereo-is-indeed-a-retransmitter-and-must-pay.
23. Zero TV Doesn't Mean Zero Video, NIELSEN.COM (Mar. I1, 2013),
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2013/zero-tv-doesnt-mean-zero-video.html.
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2012).
25. The recording of television programming for time-shifted viewing was held to be a "fair use"
under the Copyright Act in Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
26. Jonathan Strickland & James Bickers, How DVR Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM,
http://www.howstuffworks.com/dvr.htm (last visited July 7, 2013).
27. A detailed technical description of the operation of an RS-DVR can be found in Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d. 607, 612-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2007),
rev'dsub nom, Cartoon Network, LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
28. Placeshifting, SLINGBOX.COM, http://www.slingbox.com/get/placeshifting (last visited Oct.
29, 2013).
29. Aereokiller claims its technology is "better and more legally defensible than Aereo's."
Defendant Aereokiller LLC's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction;
Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 1, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller
Content Sys., Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (No. CV 12-6921-GW(JCx)). However, it is
unclear how exactly they differ, and in their respective litigations the two systems are described in
functionally identical ways.
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airing shows and shows which will air later.30 Selecting "watch" allows
the user to watch the show "live" on her chosen Internet-enabled device,
while "record" schedules a recording of a show which is either airing
currently or will air later. I To the user, the system is equivalent to an
RS-DVR accessed through the Internet. 3Y
However, Aereo's underlying technology is quite different from an
RS-DVR. Aereo maintains a large bank of antennas at its headquarters,
each about the size of a dime.33 When a user makes a "watch" request,
the user's device directs one of Aereo's antennas to tune to the requested
programming, and the antenna's output signal is encoded into data that
can be transmitted over the Internet.34 The data is then stored in a
directory on Aereo's servers, as well as transmitted to the user's
device.35 The directory data is only retained after the show has ended if
the user is "recording" the show. 36  Each user is assigned a unique
antenna and directory: "[n]o two users are assigned a single antenna at
the same time. . . [and] the data obtained by a particular antenna while
allocated to a particular user is not 'shared' with or accessible by any
other Aereo user." 37  Additionally, each antenna functions
independently rather than functioning collectively or with the assistance
of a shared metal substructure. 38 Thus, each user's viewing experience
is completely independent from that of every other user.
B. The 1976 Copyright Act
The Copyright Act of 197639 provides copyright owners with a
40"bundle" of exclusive rights in their work, which includes, "in the case
of.. .motion pictures and other audiovisual works, [the right] to
perform the copyrighted work publicly."41 Section 101 of the Copyright
Act defines "'perform' . . . in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, [as] show[ing] its images in any sequence or to make
30. Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id. at 379.
34. Id at 378.
35. Id
36. Id at 379.
37. Id. at 378.
38. Id at 381.
39. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012).
40. WILLIAM PATRY, 3 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 8.1 (2013). Other rights include the right to
reproduce the work, distribute the work, and produce derivative works based on the work. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
2013] 639
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the sounds accompanying it audible."42  It further defines "[t]o
perform ... a work 'publicly"' as
(1) to perform ... it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and
its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit43 or otherwise
communicate a performance. . . of the work to a place specified by
clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether
the members of the public capable of receiving the
performance . .. receive it in the same place or in separate places and at
the same time or at different times. 44
Since the typical Aereo user is not "performing" the work to a
substantial number of persons outside of her social circle as required by
clause (1), whether Aereo's transmission of programming to its
customers constitutes an infringement hinges on the interpretation of
clause (2) of the public performance definition, the "transmit clause."
The legislative history asserts that the definition of "transmit"
is broad enough to include all conceivable forms and combinations of
wired or wireless communications media, including but by no means
limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them. Each and
every method by which the images or sounds comprising a
performance. . . are picked up and conveyed is a "transmission," and if
the transmission reaches the public in any form, the case comes within
the scope of [the public performance right]. 45
This language still requires the transmission to reach the "public," but
the legislative history indicates a preference for a broad understanding
of when a performance is "public.'; 6
C. Applying the "Public Performance" Definition
Courts have generally agreed that when the public at large is viewing
42. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
43. "To transmit" is defined as "to communicate [a performance] by any device or process
whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent." Id.
44. Id.
45. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 61 (1975).
46. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976)
[P]ublic performance ... cover[s] not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further
act by which that rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to the public. Thus, for
example: a singer is performing when he or she sings a song; a broadcasting network is
performing when it transmits his or her performance (whether simultaneously or from records); a
local broadcaster is performing when it transmits the network broadcast; a cable television
system is performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers; and any individual is
performing whenever he or she plays a phonorecord embodying the performance or
communicates the performance by turning on a receiving set.
Id.
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or will be able to view the work, the public performance right is
infringed. For example, in National Football League v. McBee &
Bruno's, the Eighth Circuit found that no public performance had taken
place when four friends intercepted and viewed the satellite feed of an
NFL game.4 7 Though the court recognized that the defendants may be
liable for a violation of the Communications Act for intercepting the
feed, they could not be liable for infringing the public performance right
because their "performance" of the football game was not open to the
public, even though it took place in a restaurant. 4 8 On the other hand, a
business playing music for the entertainment of customers is engaged in
a public performance because the public is able to hear the music.
But what about a business that utilizes private viewing rooms or
booths? The Third Circuit tackled this question in Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc.50 The defendant, Maxwell's Video
Showcase, operated an "in-store rental" business where customers could
view video cassettes in small private booths: the customer would select
a video to watch and enter the room, at which point an employee would
place the video in a VCR and transmit the signal to the customer's
booth. 1  While the business was open to the public, only those who
rented it could access each individual booth.52 The plaintiffs argued that
this activity infringed their public performance rights and the Third
Circuit agreed, finding that "[t]he services provided by Maxwell's are
essentially the same as a movie theatre, with the additional feature of
privacy.... Simply because the cassettes can be viewed in private does
not mitigate the essential fact that Maxwell's is unquestionably open to
the public." 53 In support of its holding, it cited Professor Nimmer's
leading copyright treatise, which eerily predicted the problem the
defendant's business would present: "one may anticipate the possibility
of theaters in which patrons occupy separate screening rooms, for
greater privacy .... These too should obviously be regarded as public
performances within the underlying rationale of the Copyright Act."54
Two years later, in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc.,
the Third Circuit faced a case with very similar facts.55 The difference
47. Nat'1 Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986).
48. Id
49. See e.g., Blue Seas Music, Inc. v. Fitness Surveys, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ga. 1993);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991).
50. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
51. Id at 156-57.
52. Id at 157.
53. Id. at 159.
54. Id (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.14(C)(3) (2012)).
55. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
6412013]
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in Aveco was that the defendant did not transmit a video feed to its
viewing booths, but rather let its customers take rented videos-or
videos they had brought from home-into the booths and operate the
VCR themselves.56 The Third Circuit found these facts to be
indistinguishable from its holding in Redd Horne and again held that the
plaintiffs public performance right had been infringed. 7 The Seventh
Circuit subsequently followed Redd Horne and Aveco in a similar
58case.
An interesting wrinkle in the facts of these cases was introduced in
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors
(PREI).59 There, the customers could rent videodiscs at a hotel lobby
gift shop and take them back to their rooms to view. The only
distinction between these facts and those in Aveco was that the "viewing
rooms" were hotel rooms. The Ninth Circuit found this distinction to be
determinative: "[t]he plain language and the legislative history together
lead us to conclude that hotel guest rooms are not 'public' for purposes
of the Act .... While the hotel may indeed be 'open to the public,' a
guest's hotel room, once rented, is not."61
Two years later, the Northern District of California found a hotel
room video rental system to be factually distinguishable from that in
PREI. In that case, On Command Video Corporation v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc., the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment
that their technology did not infringe the defendants' copyrights, while
the defendants counterclaimed for copyright infringement. The
plaintiffs system involved a bank of video cassette players (VCP)
controlled by a computer.63 Each VCP contained a videotape of a film
and hotel guests could request playback of a tape via their television.64
Upon such a request, the tape would begin playing and the system
would transmit the video to the guest's television. The court found
that, since hotel rooms were not public places for copyright purposes,
infringement could only be found under the transmit clause. It found
56. Id. at 61.
57. Id. at 63-64.
58. See Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1012-13, 1020 (7th Cir. 1991).
59. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir.
1989).
60. Id at 279.
61. Id. at 280-81.
62. On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 787, 788 (N.D.
Cal. 1991).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id at 789.
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the system to be "directly under the language of the definition. [It]
'communicate[d]' the motion picture 'images and sounds' by a 'device
or process' . . . from a central console in a hotel to individual guest
rooms, where the images and sounds [were] received 'beyond the place
from which they [were] sent." 6 7 It also held that while hotel guests
were not in a public place when viewing the videos, they were
"nonetheless members of 'the public.' . . . This is because the
relationship between the transmitter of the performance, On Command,
and the audience, hotel guests, [was] a commercial, 'public' one
regardless of where the viewing [took] place."68 Since the transmission
reached members of the public, infringement was found under the
transmit clause.
The requirement that the public at large be the ultimate audience for a
"transmission" is applied to large-scale transmissions as well. In David
v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., the defendants argued that they
were not liable for copyright infringement because they were
transmitting signals only to local cable providers for retransmission and
not to the viewing public.69 However, the Southern District of New
York rejected this argument, stating that "Congress intended the
definition of [public performance] to encompass each step in the process
by which a protected work wends its way to [the public]" and that "[i]t
made little difference . .. whether [the defendants] intended to route the
protected work to the public's living rooms through a local cable
company or through a transmitter atop a mountain." 70 The D.C. District
Court followed the David court and reached the same conclusion on
nearly identical facts in National Cable Television Association v.
Broadcast Music, Inc. The Second Circuit used the same "wends its
way to the public" reasoning in National Football League v. PrimeTime
24 Joint Venture, where a satellite carrier was found liable for copyright
infringement when it uplinked transmission signals captured in the
United States and transmitted those signals to subscribers in Canada.72
D. The Second Circuit's Cablevision Decision
The above cases basically agree that when the same copy of a work is
transmitted or otherwise made available to multiple people or the public
67. Id. at 789-90.
68. Id. at 790.
69. David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
70. Id. at 759.
71. Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. Broad. Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 651 (D.D.C.
1991).
72. Nat'l Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 11-13 (2d Cir. 2000).
2013] 643
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at large, then a public performance has taken place. But what if a
unique copy is transmitted to multiple unique users? Charged with
determining the legality of an RS-DVR system, the Second Circuit
tackled this question in its best-known "transmit clause" case, Cartoon
Network, LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (the Cablevision case).73 The
defendant, a cable television provider, wanted to market an RS-DVR
service to its subscribers, and the plaintiffs, producers of copyrighted
television content, alleged that Cablevision's use of this system directly
infringed their copyrights.74 The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs,
finding that Cablevision's system infringed the plaintiffs' public
performance rights by transmitting copies of the plaintiffs' works to
consumers who requested them.75
Cablevision argued that, even though the streaming of programming
to consumers at their request was a "performance," the work was
performed by the consumer and not by them, because the customer
requested the performance. 76 They also argued that these transmissions
were not "to the public," and therefore not infringing, because they
"emanate[d] from a distinct copy of a program uniquely associated with
one customer's set-top box and intended for that customer's exclusive
viewing in his or her home."77 The trial court rejected these arguments,
stating that "Cablevision would transmit the same program to members
of the public, who may receive the performance at different times,
depending on whether they view the program in real time or at a later
time as an RS-DVR playback" and that therefore Cablevision's acts
were within the Copyright Act's transmit clause. It also relied in part
on On Command Video Corp., "which held that when the relationship
between the transmitter and the audience of a performance is
commercial, the transmission is to the public." 79
The Second Circuit disagreed with the trial court's analysis, finding
that Cablevision's RS-DVR playback did not involve a transmission "to
the public."80 The court noted that, while the statute does not define "to
the public," "[i]t does explain that a transmission may be 'to the
public ... whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
performance ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at
73. Cartoon Network, LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision 11), 536 F.3d 121 (2d. Cir.
2008).
74. Id. at 123.
75. Id.
76. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d. 607,
622 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 623.
79. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 126 (internal quotations omitted).
80. Id. at 134.
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the same time or at different times. ' And although this language
indicates that it does not matter that the
potential recipients of the transmission are in different places, or that they
may receive [it] at different times[, t]he implication from this same
language . . . is that it is relevant, in determining whether a transmission
is made to the public, to discern who is "capable of receiving" the
performance being transmitted. The fact that the statute says "capable of
receiving the performance," instead of "capable of receiving the
transmission," underscores the fact that a transmission of a performance
is itself a performance.82
Therefore, because only one subscriber is capable of receiving any
one RS-DVR transmission (or "performance"), such transmissions are
not "public." 83
The Second Circuit found the trial court's conclusion that it must
"consider not the potential audience of a particular transmission, but the
potential audience of the underlying work (i.e., 'the program') whose
content is being transmitted"84 to be untenable:
Doubtless the potential audience for every copyrighted audiovisual work
is the general public. As a result, any transmission of the content of a
copyrighted work would constitute a public performance under the
district court's interpretation. But the transmit clause obviously
contemplates the existence of non-public transmissions; if it did not,
Congress would have stopped drafting that clause after "performance." 85
The plaintiffs also argued that Cablevision was transmitting the same
"performance" of the work in its normal broadcast to its customers and
in its transmission to its RS-DVR customers: that is, "the performance
of the work that occurs when the [television station] transmits that
content to Cablevision. . . ."86 The Second Circuit found that this
argument read new language into the Copyright Act: "according to
plaintiffs, when Congress says that to perform a work publicly means to
transmit ... a performance. . . to the public, they really meant
'transmit ... the "original performance". . . to the public.' 87 This view
could not be correct, the court reasoned, because it "obviates any
possibility of a purely private transmission."88
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 135.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 135-36.
86. Id. at 136.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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Assume that HBO transmits a copyrighted work to both Cablevision and
Comcast. Cablevision merely retransmits the work from one Cablevision
facility to another, while Comcast retransmits the program to its
subscribers. Under plaintiffs' interpretation, Cablevision would still be
transmitting the performance to the public, solely because Comcast has
transmitted the same underlying performance to the public. Similarly, a
hapless customer who records a program in his den and later transmits the
recording to a television in his bedroom would be liable for publicly
performing the work simply because some other party had once
transmitted the same underlying performance to the public. We do not
believe Congress intended such odd results. Although the transmit clause
is not a model of clarity, we believe that when Congress speaks of
transmitting a performance to the public, it refers to the performance
created by the act of transmission. Thus, HBO transmits its own
performance of a work when it transmits to Cablevision, and Cablevision
transmits its own performance of the same work when it retransmits the
feed from HBO. 89
The Second Circuit thus concluded that because "each RS-DVR
transmission is made to a given subscriber using a copy made by that
subscriber" and the potential audience of each copy's transmission is
one household, "such a transmission is not 'to the public,"' and
therefore not an infringement of the public performance right. 90  In
doing so, it explicitly rejected the holding of On Command Video Corp.
that any commercial transmission is "to the public .. . as it completely
rewrites the language of the statutory definition."91 It also found On
Command and the Third Circuit's decision in Redd Horne to be
factually distinguishable because in those cases successive transmissions
to different viewers were made using a single "master copy" of a given
work, instead of each unique viewer receiving a unique transmission
from a unique copy of the work.92 It too cited Professor Nimmer's
treatise as support: "if the same copy ... of a given work is
repeatedly played (i.e. 'performed') by different members of the public,
albeit at different times, this constitutes a 'public' performance." 9
The Southern District of New York later adopted this reading of the
clause in In re Cellco Partnership, where the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) claimed that it was owed
public performance royalties for the transmission of ringtones to cellular
8 9. Id.
90. Id. at 138.
91. Id. at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id at 138-39.
93. Id. at 138 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.14 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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phones. 94 The court held that ASCAP failed to prove that a public
performance had taken place, finding that the potential audience of the
ringtone transmission was a single customer, and this type of
transmission was exempted from copyright liability.95
In Warner Brothers Entertainment v. WTV Systems, Inc., the
defendant argued that, in light of Cablevision, its Internet DVD-
streaming service did not infringe the plaintiffs public performance
right.96 However, the Central District of California determined that the
defendant's activity was outside the holding of Cablevision because the
defendant used the same copy of a DVD to stream its content to multiple
customers.97 The court instead found that the defendant's activity was
within the holdings of Redd Horne and On Command and was therefore
a public performance. 98
The following visual aid may help some readers understand the
distinction between the Second Circuit's "one copy-one user" theory
and the "one copy-multiple user" theory:
one public performance Four private(?)
Motion performances
Picture
Motion Motion Motion Motion
Pictuee Picture. Picture Picture
one copy one unique copy per user
multiple users
III. THE COMPETING OPINIONS
Even though five federal courts have now considered the controversy
at the heart of this Note, for the sake of brevity, only the Second Circuit
and Central District of California cases will be fully considered in this
Part. Some explanatory remarks regarding the D.C. District and the
94. In re Cellco P'ship, 663 F.Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
95. Id. at 371-74.
96. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. WTV Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
97. Id at l011, n.7.
98. Id
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District of Massachusetts cases will be included in the footnotes where
relevant.
A. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (2d Cir.)
The Southern District of New York denied the plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction against Aereo, finding that they were unlikely to
succeed on the merits of their copyright infringement claim because the
Aereo system was within Cablevision's holding.99 The Second Circuit
essentially agreed with the trial court on all points. It began with
thorough discussions of the "transmit clause" and Cablevision, and
found Cablevision to establish "four guideposts that determine the
outcome of this appeal." 00
First and most important, the Transmit Clause directs courts to consider
the potential audience of the individual transmission. If that transmission
is "capable of being received by the public" the transmission is a public
performance; if the potential audience of the transmission is only one
subscriber, the transmission is not a public performance, except as
discussed below. Second ... private transmissions ... should not be
aggregated. It is therefore irrelevant to the Transmit Clause analysis
whether the public is capable of receiving the same underlying work or
original performance of the work by means of many transmissions.
Third, there is an exception to this no-aggregation rule when private
transmissions are generated from the same copy of the work. In such
cases, these private transmissions should be aggregated .... Fourth and
finally, "any factor that limits the potential audience of a transmission is
relevant" to the Transmit Clause analysis.' 01
With these "guideposts" in mind, the court applied Cablevision to the
Aereo technology and found that, like in Cablevision, the potential
audience of each Aereo transmission was a single user. 02 Therefore,
the Aereo system was within the holding of Cablevision.
The court then addressed the plaintiffs' various attempts to
distinguish Aereo's technology from Cablevision. First, the plaintiffs
argued that Cablevision had a license for its initial transmission of
copyrighted programming to the public, whereas Aereo had no
license. 03 The court found this was immaterial, as a license is only
required for "public" performances; if a performance is private, no
99. Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
100. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 689 (2d Cir. 2013).
101. Id. (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 689-90.
103. Id. at 690.
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license is required.104  Next, the plaintiffs argued that discrete
transmissions should be aggregated to determine whether they constitute
a public performance, but the court stated that Cablevision explicitly
rejected this approach: "Plaintiffs are asking us to ... focus[] on the
potential audience of the . .. work ... not [that] of the particular
transmission.... [They also] provide no reason why Aereo's multiple,
audience-of-one transmissions. . . should be aggregated but not
Cablevision's ... .,,105 The plaintiffs next argued that Cablevision's
holding was confined to technologies analogous to a VCR, but the court
found no support for such a proposition. 06
The plaintiffs then argued that the RS-DVR broke the chain of
retransmission to the public in a way the Aereo system does not: "that
Aereo's copies are merely a device by which Aereo enables its users to
watch nearly live TV, while Cablevision's copies, by contrast, could
only serve as the source for a transmission of a program after the
original transmission . . . had finished." 0 7 The court found this
argument lacking, first because the user exercises the same control over
the playback in the Aereo system as it did in Cablevision's RS-DVR,
and second because each individual user receives an entirely unique
transmission from start to finish due to Aereo's antenna system. 1 The
plaintiffs argued that this finding effectively elevated form over
substance-companies could now engineer systems that exploited the
loophole created by Cablevision-but the court pointed out that this was
arguing that Cablevision was wrongly decided, not that Cablevision was
distinguishable.109
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the legislative history indicated that
Aereo's transmissions were "public," but the court pointed out that
Cablevision had already rejected that finding: "[I]f Congress intended
all transmissions to be public performances, the Transmit Clause would
not have contained the phrase 'to the public." 10 While the court
acknowledged that "unanticipated technological developments have
created tension between Congress's view that retransmissions of
network programs by cable television systems should be deemed public
104. Id.
105. Id. at 691.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 692.
108. Id. at 692-93.
109. Id at 693-94.
110. Id at 694. The District of Massachusetts found for Aereo for essentially this reason: "Aereo
responds that it is transmitting private rather than public performances per Cablevision.... [Its]
interpretation is a better reading of the statute because the 'canon against surplusage' requires this Court
to give meaning to every statutory term if possible." Hearst Stations, Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-11649
(NMG), 2013 WL 5604284, at *6 (D. Mass., Oct. 8,2013).
2013] 649
15
Pool: Don't Kill Innovation: Why the Second Circuit's "One Copy-One Use
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
performances and its intent that some transmissions be classified as
private," it nevertheless found that the language of the statute and the
legislative history compelled a finding that Aereo's transmissions were
not public performances. 'I Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the plaintiffs' request for an injunction.112
Writing in dissent, Judge Chin essentially agreed with the
plaintiffs' arguments and described Aereo's technology platform as "a
sham. ... [A] Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, over-engineered in an
attempt to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to take advantage of
a perceived loophole in the law."" He believed that "by transmitting
(or retransmitting) copyrighted programming to the public without
authorization, Aereo is engagin in copyright infringement in clear
violation of the Copyright Act."
In July 2013, the Second Circuit denied an en banc rehearing to the
plaintiffs.116  Judge Chin also filed a dissent to this denial, which
utilized much of the same reasoning as his prior dissent, but added that
he believed Cablevision to have been wrongly decided and even if it
was not wrongly decided, it should not be extended."l' In support of
both dissents, he cited the Central District of California's BarryDriller
opinion,118 to which this Note now turns.
B. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC
(C.D. Cal.)
The Central District of California stated at the outset that, while the
Aereokiller technology is likely within Cablevision's holding,
Cablevision is not the law in the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit's
precedents weighed against adopting that holding." 9  The court
explained that the Second Circuit's reading of the statute is not the only
possible reading and that the statute "does not by its express terms
require that two members of the public receive the performance from the
same transmission."l20 The court believed that the statute was
concerned only with the performance of the underlying work
111. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 695.
112. Id. at 696.
113. Judge Chin was the trial court judge in Cablevision Iwho found against Cablevision.
114. Id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 696.
116. WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2013) (denying rehearing en banc).
117. Id. at 506-12 (Chin, J., dissenting).
I18. Id. at 504 n.l 1, 507 (Chin, J., dissenting); WNET v. Aereo, at 698, 703 (Chin, J., dissenting).
119. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1143
(C.D. Cal. 2012).
120. Id. at 1144.
650 [VOL. 82
16
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss2/12
DON'T KILL INNOVATION
irrespective of which copy of the work the transmission is made from.
Very few people gather around their oscilloscopes to admire the
sinusoidal waves of a television broadcast transmission. People are
interested in watching the performance of the work. And it is the public
performance of the copyrighted work with which the Copyright Act, by
its express language, is concerned. 21
In other words, to the court, a performance is public if the copyrighted
work reaches the public, not if the transmission itself reaches the public.
The court also found the Aereo and Cablevision courts' reasoning
"that the defendant was providing a service equivalent to what
individuals could lawfully do for themselves" to be misplaced in light of
other parts of the Copyright Act.122 In the 1976 Act, "Congress found
that 'cable systems are commercial enterprises whose basic
retransmission operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted
program material and . .. copyright royalties should be paid by cable
operators to the creators of such programs."' 23  Likewise, the court
believed that the creators of copyrighted programs were entitled to
copyright royalties from Aereokiller's retransmissions. 124
In short, the court found that because Aereokiller "sen[t] out some
sort of signal via a device or process to be received by the public at a
place beyond the place from which it is sent," it infringed the plaintiffs'
public performance right and thus the plaintiffs were likely to succeed
on the merits of their copyright infringement claim.12 5
IV. ANALYSIS: WHY THE SECOND CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT
Faced with these competing decisions, future courts that examine this
or similar issues will have to choose which to follow. This Part argues
that the Second Circuit's "one copy-one user" doctrine is not only a
121. Id. at 1144-45.
122. Id. at 1145.
123. Id. at 1146.
124. Id
125. Id (quoting Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof'1 Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d
278, 282 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The D.C. District essentially agreed:
The Court finds that the provisions of the 1976 Act that protect Plaintiffs' work are clear:
FilmOn X's service violates Plaintiffs' "exclusive right . . to perform the copyrighted work
publicly." By making available Plaintiffs' copyrighted performances to any member of the
public who accesses the FilmOn X service, FilmOn X performs the copyrighted work publicly as
defined by the Transmit Clause: FilmOn X "transmit[s] ... a performance ... of the work ... to
the public, by means of any device or process.' . . . Even assuming arguendo that the 1976 Act
contains any ambiguity, the legislative history confirms Congress's intent that the Transmit
Clause and § 106(4) be applied broadly.
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X, L.L.C., No. 13-758 (RMC), 2013 WL 4763414, at *13-14
(D.D.C., Sept. 5, 2013).
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preferable reading of the statute, but also better policy. Unless Congress
clarifies that truly private performances/transmissions are indeed legal
under the act, then the Aereo decision should be followed. This Part
also briefly addresses why one particular legislative solution should not
be adopted.
A. "One Copy-One User" Is Good Law
The transmit clause-and the Copyright Act in general-is not a
"model of clarity."1 26  One reason for this is that Congress tends to
revise copyright law by allowing the content industries to negotiate
among themselves to decide what they want the law to be and then
present their proposals to Congress.127 This not only takes the end user
out of the thought process but also results in legislation written by
lawyers, for lawyers-a group not known for valuing clarity.
Another reason is that the entire idea of copyright "has taken shape
around the model of a book communicated to the public by
multiplication of copies," and not "communication .. .by performance
or representation."1 As such, the law has historically had trouble
adapting to new technologies. 131
In the absence of a Supreme Court ruling on the subject, we are left
to guess at what Congress intended when they wrote the transmit clause
in the 1970s. The confusion centers on the final half of the clause:
"whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
performance . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places and at
the same time or at different times."1  The language allows for four
distinct possibilities for members of the public to view a performance:
(1) in the same place at the same time; (2) in separate places at the same
time; (3) in the same place at separate times; and (4) in separate places
at separate times. 33 The first two alternatives are easily illustrated by
126. Cartoon Network, LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2008).
127. For a thorough examination of this particular style of legislative "sausage-making," see
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2006).
128. See id. at 31-32.
129. Benjamin Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question ofPhonograph Records, 103
U. Pa. L. Rev. 469,473 (1955).
130. See Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc., 89 Or. L. Rev. 505, 506 (2010).
131. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to Cablevision. Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC
Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). It granted certiorari to WNETv. Aereo on January 10, 2014, and
held oral arguments on April 22, 2014. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/american-broadcasting-companies-inc-v-
aereo-inc/ (last visited May 1, 2014).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
133. Malkan, supra note 130, at 514.
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common scenarios: the first by a group of people watching a live
performance simulcast to a movie theater, 134 the second by a standard
television broadcast. The third possibility was the scenario in Redd
Horne. But what about the fourth?
Jeffrey Malkan hypothesized that what Congress envisioned in the
fourth possibility was the so-called "celestial jukebox," a service that
gives consumers access to chosen media on demand.' 35 Malkan argues
that the RS-DVR produces content on demand and thus falls into this
definition; because of this, Cablevision-and by extension Aereo-was
wrongly decided.136 Malkan attributes the error to the Second Circuit's
misreading of the statute:
[T]he transmit clause specifies that "members of the public" must be
"capable of receiving the performance," not "capable of receiving the
transmission." [The Cablevision court] thought that the words
"performance" and "transmission" were interchangeable in this context
because the statute imposes liability on anyone who transmits an
unauthorized performance to the public. But even though the transmit
clause refers ... to "the performance created by the act of transmission,"
a transmission and a performance remain, technically and legally, two
distinct things. The difference between them is that a transmission is the
medium through which a performance is delivered "to the public." This
is why there may be more than one transmission of the same
performance, that is, why members of the public may receive a public
performance at "different times."l 37
Malkan's theory is persuasive, but still problematic, because it does
not address a central question: how can a "private" performance exist
under this reading? Perhaps Congress did intend to eliminate any
possibility of a commercial entity "privately" transmitting a copyrighted
work, but then why specify that the definition applies when a
transmission is "to the public," and to "members of the public?" As the
District of Massachusetts pointed out, the "rule against surplusage"
requires courts to give effect to this language.13 8
134. The Metropolitan Opera frequently simulcasts its performances to theaters as part of its
"Live in HD" series. 2013-14 Live in HD Season Schedule, THE METROPOLITAN OPERA,
http://www.metoperafamily.org/metoperalliveinhd/LiveinHD.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2013). Bands
such as Phish have also simulcast their concerts to movie theaters. Troy Carpenter, Phish Concert to Be
Simulcast in Theaters, BILLBOARD.COM (May 25, 2004, 12:00 AM),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1436791/phish-concert-to-be-simulcast-in-theaters.
135. Malkan, supra note 130, at 543. The term "celestial jukebox" was coined by Prof. Paul
Goldstein in his 1994 book Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox. Such
technologies are called "interactive services" by the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7).
136. Malkan, supra note 130, at 544.
137. Id. at 536 (footnotes omitted).
138. Hearst Stations, Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-11649 (NMG), 2013 WL 5604284, at *6 (D.
Mass., Oct. 8, 2013).
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Consider the following scenario: A person attaches an .mp3 file of a
copyrighted songl39 to an email and sends it to five people. The
recipients' email client allows audio file playback to be streamed
directly from the email server rather than requiring the intermediate step
of downloading the file to the user's hard drive. In this situation,
assuming he did not have the copyright holder's permission, the initial
sender of the email has infringed the copyright holder's distribution
right. That's the easy question. The harder question is whether the
email provider infringed the public performance right by streaming the
audio file to the recipients. It has "transmitted" the work "by means of
[a] process" to "members of the public capable of receiving the
performance" in "separate places" at "separate times," so the situation
appears to fit the definition. But is this really what Congress intended?
What if the email was sent to 100 people?
Now consider a different scenario. Five unrelated people separately
upload the exact same recording of a song to the same cloud-based
storage service. This service also allows audio file playback to be
streamed directly from its servers rather than requiring the file to be first
downloaded to a device. When the individual users stream the audio, is
the storage service publicly performing the song? Again, the situation
seems to fit a strict reading of the transmit clause.
It could be argued that the above scenarios are distinguishable from a
true "celestial jukebox" service like Spotify or Rhapsody because those
services provide a large database of copyrighted works for the consumer
to choose from, whereas the above scenarios depend on an individual
user first uploading something he already owns to a server. Congress
only intended, this argument goes, to reach the conduct of "celestial
jukebox" services, and not the streaming described in the above
scenarios. But where is this distinction in the statute's definition of a
public performance?
If this distinction is read into the statute, an absurd result is created by
an RS-DVR. A cable provider would be liable for infringement for
operating an RS-DVR service as described in Cablevision. It would not,
however, be liable if the customer first recorded a copy of a television
show to the customer's own set-top box and then uploaded the copy to
the cable provider's servers for storage and later streaming. The two
situations are functionally identical, yet the intermediate step through
139. Recordings of musical works embody two copyrights: that of the underlying musical
composition (the "circle c" right) and that of the sound recording itself (the "circle p" right). See 17
U.S.C. §§ 401, 402. Sound recording copyrights are treated differently for the purposes of the public
performance right, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(6), but this hypothetical still holds true if we consider that the
public performance right in the underlying musical composition is being infringed, rather than the
performance right of the sound recording.
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the consumer's set-top box somehow makes it a "private" performance.
Likewise, a Slingbox is legal because the video stream originates from
the user's equipment, but Aereo is "not" legal because the stream
originates instead from Aereo's servers. These are distinctions without
a difference. If a transmission is linchpin, then why would Congress be
concerned only with whose equipment the copy of the video originated
from?' 40
The "one unique copy per user" interpretation of the clause is
preferable because it properly takes into account who is "capable of
receiving the performance." If only one user can access a copy of a
work, the audience for that copy is clearly not "the public." It should
not matter then whether the user is the one who uploads the copy to the
server or if she requests that a service provider makes the copy on her
behalf. If a user can legally access the copy-whether by purchasing a
copy of the work, or by purchasing a cable subscription that provides
access to the work, or by virtue of the work being broadcast over public
airwaves-then companies should be able to provide access to that copy
to a unique user at her request. The mere fact that a service provider has
discovered a way to monetize an otherwise fair or legal use should not
by itself defeat the fairness or legality of the use. 14 1
Malkan and the Central District of California were correct in pointing
out that this is not the only possible reading of the statute. However, the
Copyright Act does not exist solely to protect the rights of copyright
holders, because the Constitution commands that it must "promote the
Progress of Science."l42 Implicit in the requirement of the progression
of science is that the public has access to the "ideas" embodied in
140. Web commentary has also identified this problem with the Central District of California and
D.C. Districts' rulings:
The only real difference between someone watching a TV show remotely online using an
antenna in their own home with a Slingbox and doing what the [Aereo and Aereokiller] services
do is in where "the box" and "the antenna" are placed. That's it. That means the real difference
is merely the length of the wire between the TV and the antenna/recording device. If the cable is
long (i.e., the antenna and recording device are at a different location), suddenly, according to
these two courts, it's a "public performance." If the cable is short, it's not. That doesn't make
any logical sense at all.
Mike Masnick, As Expected, TV Networks Win Copyright Ruling Against Alki David's Name-Changing
TV Streaming Service, TECHDIRT.COM (Sept. 6, 2013, 1:41 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130906/02041524425/as-expected-tv-networks-win-copyright-
ruling-against-alki-davids-name-changing-tv-streaming-service.shtml.
141. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) ("The crux of
the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether
the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price.").
142. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In this context, "Science" broadly means "knowledge and
learning." JULIE E. COHEN, LYDIA PALLAS LOREN, RUTH L. OKEDUI, & MAUREEN A. O'RouRKE,
COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 23 (3d. ed. 2010).
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copyrighted "expression."l43 It is thus not unreasonable to resolve a
statutory ambiguity in the Copyright Act in favor of ease of access to
cultural information-i.e., television programming--even at the
supposed expense of a copyright holder. This is ultimately why the
Second Circuit's reasoning should be adopted rather than the Central
District of California's.
However, there is further justification for rejecting the BarryDriller
holding. The court stated that Cablevision was not the law in the Ninth
Circuit and that the Second Circuit's "one user-one copy" theory was in
tension with Ninth Circuit precedent.'" However, it cites only to the
On Command decision for this proposition and, as discussed earlier, that
decision is actually consistent with the "one user-one copy" theory
adopted by the Second Circuit because in On Command the infringing
transmissions originated from a single "master copy" of the work. The
Cablevision decision differs only in that the On Command court held
that any commercial relationship between audience and transmitter is
"to the public." The BarryDriller court answered this criticism by
stating that the Second Circuit's "one copy-one user" distinction is only
relevant "if one focuses on whether the transmission is publicly
performed. Precedent in the Ninth Circuit instead properly looks at
public performance of the copyrighted work."l 45 But again, it cites to
no other Ninth Circuit precedent that holds as such, and in fact the
Central District of California had previously found in Warner Brothers
v. WTV Systems that the Second Circuit's "one copy-one user" theory
was consistent with the holdings in On Command and Redd Horne.
The BarryDriller holding essentially reads the possibility of a private
performance out of the statute, which, as discussed above, is not an ideal
interpretation of the transmit clause.
B. "One Copy-One User" Is Good Policy
Broadcast television networks receive revenue from selling
143. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283 (1996); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The limited scope of
the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the
Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.").
144. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144-
45 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
145. Id.
146. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. WTV Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011 n.7 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
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advertisements,'147 and cable television networks (e.g., ESPN, CNN) are
no different.148 The price each network can command for its adtime is
determined by how many viewers are watching and, to a lesser extent,
the demographics of those viewers. 149 This has been the business model
for television since its inception. 50
With such an entrenched history, it is understandable that networks
have an interest in maintaining the status quo. However, the status quo
is changing, whether the networks like it or not. A simple look at
demographic trends among television viewers illustrates this. The most
watched American broadcast network is CBS,151 the network with the
oldest average viewership.152 Overall, the median age of the broadcast
television audience is increasing over time. 153 Cable/satellite television
is taking a large share of the broadcast audience,154 but an increasing
number of cost-conscious viewers are "cutting the cord" and eliminating
these services too. 155  Such viewers are still watching TV shows, but
they are watching via Internet-based video services like HuluPlus or
Netflix.156 The conclusion to draw from these facts is that older viewers
are still watching traditional television, but that generation is being
replaced by one that is less interested in traditional television viewing,
and this media fragmentation creates difficulty for the networks. After
all, they cannot command a high price for adtime if they cannot prove
that people are watching their content and its associated advertising
during broadcasts.
The television networks, and for that matter, the film industry and the
147. WALTER S. MCDOWELL, BROADCAST TELEVISION: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE INDUSTRY
45-66 (2006).
148. Cable television networks receive additional revenue by licensing their programming to
cable and satellite providers. Kimberly Shumway, TVBusiness Model Explained, SurrE101.COM (Aug.
24, 2009), http://suitel0l.com/article/tv-business-model-explained-al89874.
149. MCDOWELL, supra note 147, at 54-56.
150. Id. at 46-50.
151. Nellie Andreeva, 2011-2012 Season Network Rankings: Fox Still on Top but Down, NBC in
Third, CW Falls, DEADLINE.COM (May 24, 2012, 4:49 PM), http://www.deadline.com/2012/05/2011-
12-season-network-rankings-fox-still-on-top-but-down-nbc-in-third-cw-falls/.
152. Andy Fixmer, From CBS, Advertisers Get the Older Viewers They Want,
BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-09-06/from-cbs-
advertisers-get-the-older-viewers-they-want.
153. Andreeva, supra note 151.
154. Eric Deggans, Cable Ratings Bode Ill for Broadcast Networks, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Mar. 13, 2013, 7:32 AM),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/lifeandentertainment/2013/03/13/cable-ratings-bode-ill-for-
broadcast.html.
155. Heather Struck, Is 2013 the Year to Cut the Cable Cord?, REUTERS.COM (Jan. 9, 2013, 12:23
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/09/us-moneypack-family-entertainment-
idUSBRE9080XO20130109.
156. See Rebecca Greenfield, Fear of a Cord-Never Generation, THEATLANTICWIRE.COM (Feb.
12, 2013), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/02/fear-cord-never-generation/62033/.
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recording industry, would like to maintain the predigital status quo.
New technology brings new unknowns, and the past behavior of these
industries shows that they are terrified of the unknown. The VCR
provides a clear example. After Sony developed the Betamax in the
early 1970s, they were sued by Universal and Disney on a theory of
contributory copyright infringement: by giving consumers the ability to
record television programming and/or copy films, the theory goes, Sony
was liable for their customers' infringement. 5 7 The film industry spoke
about the technology in apocalyptic terms. Jack Valenti, then head of
the Motion Picture Association of America, testified before Congress
that "the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public
as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone."158 He argued:
One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and creative
judgment to understand the devastation on the after-theater marketplace
caused by the hundreds of millions of tapings that will adversely impact
on the future of the creative community in this count. It is simply a
question of basic economics and plain common sense.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, found for Sony, ruling that the
VCR was capable of substantial noninfringing uses, and therefore that a
permanent injunction against the technology was inappropriate.160
Despite this decision, the film industry and the "after-theater
marketplace" were not "devastated." In fact, the home video market
that resulted from the VCR's continued existence is a major revenue
generator for the American film industry.161 It is startling to think that
the film industry came within one Supreme Court vote of successfully
suing the lucrative home video market out of existence due to fear of the
unknown. Instead, they were forced into a new paradigm, and they
figured out how to not only survive but thrive.
By contrast, we can examine the recording industry in the aftermath
of the Ninth Circuit decision which outlawed Napster. It is no secret
157. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 75.
158. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R.
5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti, President,
Motion Picture Ass'n of America).
159. Copyright Infingements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on S. 1758 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 459 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture
Ass'n of America).
160. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
161. DVD sales are the most profitable form of distribution for movie studios. See How Movie
Studios Make Money, BLOOMBERG BusINESSWEEK (Sept. 13, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-09-13/how-movie-studios-make-money; Edward Jay
Epstein, #3 How Studios Make Money, HOLLYWOOD DEMYSTIFIED,
http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/Demyst3.htm (last visited July 7, 2013).
162. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (2001).
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that the industry has hit hard times since the advent of file sharing, 163
and it would seem that the industry's legal victories have had little to no
success in engineering a recovery.164 Many have speculated that the
industry's failure to adapt to the new digital paradigm, and its attempt to
sue the new technology out of existence, had a chilling effect on
innovation and contributed heavily to the industry's problems.165
Professor Michael A. Carrier's survey of investors, CEOs, and other
players in the technology industries bears this out. A record label
official told Carrier "that 'even the threat of a lawsuit ... really does
slow down investment in the space.' This respondent was 'sure' there
were 'quite a few' innovative services that 'never came to life' because
of 'the threat of potential lawsuits from content owners."' 1 66  The
respondents universally acknowledged that the Napster decision "'put
such a chilling effect on everything,"' and "concluded that 'from 2000
to 2010, even to this day, there reall hasn't been new innovation in
digital music other than iTunes."" 6  Another lamented that "[i]t is
'inherently hard to quantify' the 'new disruptive technologies we're
losing' because . . . 'for every one [that gets shut down], there are ten
new ideas that never get developed ... because people don't see it as an
area where they ought to be investing their time and money."' 68
Venture capitalists also see the problem:
One venture capitalist (VC) explained that [after Napster] the market
"became a wasteland" with "no music deals getting done." Another
noted that Napster "cast a pall over companies getting funded." A third
explained that "there was no venture capital going into music companies
because there was a lot of debris from companies strewn about." In fact,
"the graveyard of music companies was just overflowing." After
Napster, it was "a scorched earth kind of place" in which "nobody
touched anything." As a result, there was a "lost decade after the Napster
decision." . . . There is "no question" that the copyright lawsuits "chased
away innovators.". . . Another respondent similarly concluded that
"today, if you go to a VC and tell them you have a business you want to
163. "Sales of recordings dropped from a high of $14.6 billion in 1999 back to $8.5 billion in
2008 (a decrease of over 40 percent)." GEOFFREY P. HULL, THOMAS HUTCHISON, & RICHARD
STRASSER, THE MuSiC BUSINESS AND RECORDING INDUSTRY 29 (3d. ed. 2011).
164. "In the end, the [RIAA's] lawsuit campaign has had little impact on the amount of
copyrighted music that is illegally downloaded." STEVE KNOPPER, APPETITE FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION:
THE SPECTACULAR CRASH OF THE RECORD INDUSTRY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 188 (2010).
165. See, e.g., id.
166. Michael A. Carrier, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, TPP: An Alphabet Soup of Innovation-Stifling
Copyright Legislation and Agreements, 11 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 21, 35 (2013) (footnotes
omitted).
167. Id at 40.
168. Id
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build around digital music, very very few would listen." 169
Though media companies may be more comfortable in the status quo,
maintaining the status quo is not always good for business. The motion
picture companies were forced to adapt to a new paradigm after Sony
and found themselves making even more money. Meanwhile, the
recording industry may have succeeded in outlawing file-sharing
technology, but in the process they also killed digital music innovation
and potential new income streams. The lesson here is clear: litigation
kills innovation, "the lifeblood of the economy.... [And g]iven the
fragile state of the economy, we should tread lightly before tampering
with this powerhouse of economic growth."1 70
Professor Josh Lerner's study of the effects of the Cablevision
decision on cloud computing investment reinforces this idea. Lerner
found that venture capital investment in cloud computing "increased
significant in the U.S. relative to the EU after the Cablevision
decision."' Additionally, decisions that constrict allowable uses under
copyright law can have a negative effect on the economy because "in the
21st century ... what copyright leaves unregulated-the 'fair use
economy'-is as economically significant as what it regulates." 72
Courts should take this lesson to heart as the Aereo/Aereokiller litigation
continues. The Second Circuit's reading of the statute is not only
legally sound, but it will also do less damage to innovation. When new
technologies are within a reasonable interpretation of the law, courts
should get out of the way of progress and stop "protecting" industries
from the unknown. The Constitution requires copyright to "promote the
Progress of Science," not to maintain the status quo. The content
industries, like every other, must adapt or die.
169. Id. at 42-44 (footnotes omitted).
170. Id at 49.
171. Josh Lerner, The Impact of Copyright Policy Changes on Venture Capital Investment in
Cloud Computing Companies 1, available at
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/LernerFaIl201 ICopyrightPolicy
VCInvestments.pdf (last visited July 7, 2013).
172. COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, FAIR USE IN THE U.S.
ECONOMY: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE 5 (2010), available at
http://www.ccianet.org/CCLAJfiles/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000354/fair-use-study-final.pdf
The research indicates that the industries benefiting from fair use and other [copyright]
limitations and exceptions make a large and growing contribution to the U.S. economy. The fair
use economy in 2007 accounted for $4.7 trillion in revenues and $2.2 billion in value added,
roughly 16.2 percent of U.S. GDP. It employed more than 17 million people and supported a
payroll of $1.2 trillion. It generated $281 billion in exports and rapid productivity growth.
Id at 29.
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C A Final Note on Legislative Solutions
Given the ambiguity of the Copyright Act, it would not be improper
to suggest a legislative solution to this problem. Writing the "one copy-
one user" doctrine itself into the act would not be ideal, as the rapid pace
of technological change may make it irrelevant, or the doctrine may not
be broad enough to encompass some new unforeseen technology. What
would be preferable is for Congress to clarify that truly private
performances/transmissions are legal under the act, and/or to clarify the
definition of"to the public."
One solution Congress should not pursue was proposed in a 2011
student comment from the Touro Law Review.173  This commentator
proposed that to "adequately compensate the copyright owners for their
potential loss in revenue due to the widespread usage of the RS-DV-R
system," Congress should adopt legislation similar to the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), which was intended to help
compensate copyright owners of prerecorded music by imposing per-
device royalty payments on digital audio tape (DAT) recorders. This
naYve solution misunderstands the actual purpose and impact of the
AHRA: the death of consumer DAT technology.
Anyone familiar with DAT knows that it never saw widespread use
outside of the recording studio. This is because content owners
threatened litigation against the manufacturers of DAT recorders and
forced them to implement digital rights management schemes into the
technology that largely inhibited their functionality.175 Furthermore, the
protracted legal wrangling that culminated in the AHRA delayed the
introduction of the technology to American consumers by six years,
which sealed its fate.176 Because the technology never got off the
ground, no significant royalties were ever generated by the act.177
If similar legislation were to be enacted around cloud-based television
technologies, the results could be similarly devastating. Should
Congress get involved in this area, it should enter on the side of the
users and not on the side of the content industries. Consumers'
preferences are changing; it is time the industries were forced to change
along with them and adapt to the new paradigm.
173. Justin M. Jacobson, Cablevision's Remote DV-R System and a Solution for the Digital-
Recording Age, 27 TOuRO L. REv. 461 (2011).
174. Id. at 498-99.
175. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FuTuRE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 84-85 (2004).
176. Id. at 86.
177. "The total amount of royalties peaked at $5.5 million in 2000, and since then has been
hovering around $3.5 million per year-roughly .03 percent of the total amount of revenue that
American consumers pay each year for musical recordings." Id. at 87.
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V. CONCLUSION
The ultimate fate of the Aereo/Aereokiller technology is uncertain.
Even if the legal controversy is settled in favor of its continued lawful
existence, it is too early to tell whether it will be a hit with consumers.
It would be a shame, however, if the technology is killed by the courts
before it even gets a chance to succeed or fail on its own merits. By
ruling as it did, the Second Circuit properly ruled on the side of
consumers and innovation.
We cannot yet see the future of television, but all indicators point to a
strong Internet presence. The "one copy-one user" doctrine allows
cloud-based transmission services to continue to develop unimpeded.
Ultimately, Congress should revise the Copyright Act to remove the
ambiguities that permit the reading adopted in the decisions that ruled
against Aereokiller. In the absence of such legislative action, the other
circuits should adopt the Second Circuit's Aereo holding. The content
industries do not need Congress to hold their hands. They should be
forced to adapt to the times and find business models that serve the
changing wants and needs of consumers. This will properly "promote
the Progress of Science."
There has grown up in the minds of certain groups in this country the
notion that just because a man or corporation has made a profit out of the
public for a number of years, the government and the courts are charged
with guaranteeing such profit in the future, even in the face of changing
circumstances and contrary public interest. This strange doctrine is
supported by neither statute nor common law. Neither individuals nor
corporations have any right to come into court and ask that the clock of
history be stopped, or turned back, for their private benefit.
-Robert A. Heinlein, author, 1939.
178. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, Life-Line, in THE PAST THROUGH TOMORROW 25 (1967).
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